

Message Text

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42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 013486

O 081634Z SEP 75

FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2103

INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY GABORONE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LUSAKA 1718

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PINS SA ZA RH

SUBJECT: RHODESIA: HELPING TO GET NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED

REF: LUSAKA 1685; PRETORIA 3385

1. VERY MUCH APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR BOWDLER'S
SUPPORT FOR RECOMMENDATION THAT SOME USG RESPONSE TO KAUNDA'S
CONCERN IS MERITED. HOPE DEPT WILL PROVIDE REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS TO HIM TO APPROACH PM VORSTER FOR LATEST SAG
ASSESSMENT ON SMITH'S WILLINGNESS TO RESUME TALKS; TO REPEAT,
AS APPROPRIATE, SECRETARY'S STATEMENT TO ZAMBIAN FONMIN BANDA
(USUN SECTO 11003) RE OUR SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN EFFORTS FOR
PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN RHODESIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA; AND TO
SEEK VORSTER'S VIEW ON LIKELIHOOD OF SMITH BREAKING DEADLOCK
BY CREATION OF IMMUNITY ZONE AT VICTORIA FALLS AND
INVITING UNITED ANC (STRESS ON UNITED) TO PARTICIPATE
IN NEGOTIATIONS.

2. IT MAY INDEED APPEAR, AS AMBASSADOR BOWDLER'S
STIMULATING AND HELPFUL ANALYSIS PRETORIA REFTTEL
SUGGESTS, THAT KAUNDA IS OVER-ESTIMATING USG ABILITY
TO INFLUENCE VORSTER. KAUNDA DID THIS BACK IN 1973
WHEN HE BEGAN TO THINK ABOUT RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF
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RESUMING DIALOGUE WITH VORSTER. HOWEVER, BY TIME OF KAUNDA

VISIT TO US IN APRIL, HIS ASSISTANT MARK CHONA HAD ESTABLISHED A FIRM AND PROMISING WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH BRAND FOURIE AND ZAMBIANS TOOK ON A MORE CONFIDENT STANCE TOWARD SOUTH AFRICANS. MOREOVER, THEY LEARNED FROM EXPERIENCE THAT USG WOULD NOT JUMP INTO ACTION EVERY TIME ZAMBIANS SHOUTED "FIRE." OVER PAST SIX MONTHS, THEREFORE, ZAMBIAN APPROACHES TO US ON QUESTION OF PERSUADING SAG TO ACT HAVE BECOME MORE RELAXED AND MORE REALISTIC. THEY HAVE BEEN MORE IN NATURE OF REQUESTS FOR USG-SAG CONSULTATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT IN DEALINGS WITH SMITH THAN DEMANDS FOR HIGH-PRESSURE ACTION THAT WOULD TAKE USG OUT IN FRONT, AS WAS EARLIER THE CASE. THIS SUBTLE DIFFERENCE IN ZAMBIAN APPROACHES TO US IS WORTH NOTING.

3. VORSTER MAY BELIEVE KAUNDA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC POSITION IS SO DIRE HE IS WILLING TO REOPEN BORDER WITH RHODESIA (THUS WEAKENING SANCTIONS AGAINST SMITH REGIME) PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT MEANINGFUL SMITH ANC TALKS OR TO TAKE DRASTIC MEASURES AGAINST SITHOLE AND CHIKEREMA TO PRODUCE ANC NEGOTIATING TEAM LED BY MODERATES LIKE NKOMO EXPECTED TO STRIKE QUICK BARGAIN WITH SMITH. THIS ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE MISJUDGMENT OF KAUNDA'S GOOD SENSE AND STRONG MORAL CONVICTIONS, AND OVERLOOKS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES WHICH OTHER AFRICAN LEADERS, ESPECIALLY NYERERE AND MACHEL, CAN EXERT ON KAUNDA NOT TO TAKE THESE STEPS. HOWEVER IRRITATED AND IMPATIENT KAUNDA MAY NOW BE WITH SITHOLE AND HOWEVER MUCH HE MAY PRIVATELY FAVOR NKOMO, KAUNDA HAS REPEATEDLY SAID (AND MUST BE BELIEVED) THAT LEADERSHIP OF ANC AND OF A FREE ZIMBABWE IS NOT FOR ZAMBIA OR ANY OTHER AFRICAN STATE TO DECIDE BUT FOR PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY. FURTHERMORE, IT UNLIKELY THAT NYERERE OR SAMORA MACHEL, WHO HAVE ALWAYS SYMPATHIZED WITH ZANU FACTION, WOULD SUPPORT TRUMPED UP DETENTION ORDER AGAINST SITHOLE AS ACCEPTABLE MEANS TO GET NEGOTIATIONS BACK ON TRACT. AS FOR CHIKEREMA, HIS STANDING WITH STATE HOUSE HAS ALWAYS BEEN HIGH AND HIS PRESENT POSITION WITHIN ANC LEADERSHIP PROBABLY STEMS AS MUCH FROM ZAMBIAN FAVOR AS FROM ANY POLITICAL OR MILITARY FOLLOWING CHIKEREMA MAY HAVE AMONG RHODESIAN

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NATIONALISTS.

4. FOR SAME REASONS IT UNREALISTIC TO BELIEVE KAUNDA WOULD OR COULD OBTAIN SUPPORT OF OTHER AFRICAN LEADERS TO AGREE REMOVE SITHOLE AND CHIKEREMA FROM ANC NEGOTIATING TEAM MERELY TO OVERCOME IMMUNITY ISSUE. ANY ATTEMPT TO DO SO WOULD LIKELY FURTHER WIDEN CRACKS IN ANC UNITY AND RISK DENUNCIATION BY SITHOLE

AND OTHER MILITANTS OF ENTIRE EFFORT ACHIEVE
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

5. SCALING DOWN TO NEGOTIABLE DIMENSIONS PARA 5 OF
VICTORIA FALLS DECLARATION OF INTENT (WHICH ZAMBIANS,
ANC, AND LEGAL DRAFTERS ALL SAY WAS DRAFTED DELIBERATELY
BROAD FOR NEGOTIATION'S SAKE) OR THE OTHER OPTION OF
CREATING AN IMMUNITY ZONE ON RHODESIAN SIDE OF VICTORIA
FALLS ARE MORE REALISTIC POSSIBILITIES. AS INDICATED
TO ME (LUSAKA 1685), KAUNDA PREFERS THIS LATTER OPTION
AS BEING EASIEST AND LEAST CONTROVERSIAL COURSE AND
THEREFORE ONE MOST LIKELY OF ACCEPTANCE BY SMITH AND
ANC. KASANDA, CHONA'S DEPUTY, TOLD ME
SEPT 8 THIS WAS ALSO PREFERRED OPTION OF ANC AND OF THE
THREE OTHER AFRICAN PRESIDENTS. MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE
TELLS ME THIS ALSO MAKES MOST SENSE TO UK.

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AMEMBASSY GABORONE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LUSAKA 1718

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6. MY KEYED COMMENTS ON AMBASSADOR BOWDLER'S SUGGESTED
TALKING POINTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. NO PROBLEM.

B. STRONGLY BELIEVE AMBASSADOR BOWDLER SHOULD NOT
RPT NOT COMMENT ON ZAMBIAN ECONOMIC SITUATION AND
POLITICAL PROBLEMS ALONG LINES SUGGESTED. WE UNDERSTAND

KAUNDA DID DISCUSS ZAMBIAN TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES AND FOREIGN CAPITAL NEEDS WITH VORSTER AT THEIR VICTORIA FALLS TALKS AND THUS CAN ASSUME THAT VORSTER HAS BEEN TOLD AS MUCH AS KAUNDA PRESENTLY WISHES HIM TO KNOW ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD BE BOTH INAPPROPRIATE AND VERY RISKY FOR USG TO SUGGEST THAT KAUNDA'S POLITICAL POSITION IS BEING UNDERMINED BY RHODESIAN STALEMATE. IN ADDITION TO OUR CONCERN SUCH COMMENTS MIGHT EVENTUALLY GET BACK TO ZAMBIANS AND HURT US HERE, IT WOULD BE SERIOUS MISTAKE TO SUGGEST TO VORSTER THAT KAUNDA'S MODERATING INFLUENCE IN DANGER OF BEING IMPAIRED OR REMOVED. THIS MIGHT LEAD VORSTER TO QUESTION WHETHER KAUNDA IN FACT IS EFFECTIVE OR LASTING PARTNER TO DEAL WITH IN TRYING BRING ABOUT RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT. MORE EFFECTIVE ARGUMENT, IN OUR VIEW, WOULD BE ONE WHICH POINTS OUT THAT DELAY IN RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS

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RISKS PLAYING INTO HANDS OF MILITANTS, SPLITTING AND ISOLATING ANC MODERATES, BULK OF WHICH INSIDE RHODESIA, AND LEAVING NEWLY FORMED ZLC UNDER SITHOLE--WITH ALMOST CERTAIN BACKING FROM MOST AFRICAN STATES AND FROM COMMUNISTS-- TO THROW ASIDE ALL HOPES OF ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND TO RESUME ARMED STRUGGLE.

C. GENERALLY AGREE. BELIEVE NO SPECIFIC MENTION NEED BE MADE TO SITHOLE AND CHIKEREMA AS WE WOULD IN NO WAY WANT TO CONVEY IMPRESSION USG ENDORSES OR FAVORS THESE TWO. RATHER, STRESS MIGHT BE PLACED ON FACT THAT ANY OF ANC LEADERS EXLUDED FROM PARTICIPATION IN ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS STANDS IN POSITION TO ATTACK AND POSSIBLY TO UPSET ANY AGREEMENT ARRIVED AT. THEY WOULD THUS STAND WIELD GREATER INFLUENCE FROM OUTSIDE THAN FROM INSIDE NEGOTIATING CONFERENCE. THIS POINT SHOULD BE IMPRESSED UPON SMITH SO THAT HE WILL UNDERSTAND POTENTIAL FOLLY OF TRYING TO SPLIT ANC.

D. AGREE, BUT BELIEVE REFERENCE TO KAUNDA IS GRATUITOUS AND SHOULD BE DROPPED. MOREOVER, IN EVENT ANC RADICALS REFUSED TO ACCEPT REASONABLE IMMUNITY FORMULA, WE BELIEVE THEY LIKELY FACE PRESSURES TO BE FLEXIBLE NOT ONLY FROM KAUNDA BUT FROM OTHER THREE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS MOST DEEPLY INVOLVED. NOT ONLY KAUNDA BUT MACHEL AND TO LESSER DEGREE KHAMA HAVE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS THAT WOULD BE SERVED BY EARLY PROGRESS TOWARD RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT AND THAT WOULD BE SEVERELY STRAINED WERE TALKS TO BREAK DOWN IRREVOCABLY.

7. TO TALKING POINTS SUGGESTED BY AMBASSADOR BOWDLER, I WOULD SUGGEST ADDITION OF ONE MORE, NAMELY, THAT VORSTER

NOT AWAIT OUTCOME OF POSTPONED MEETING OF AFRICAN PRESIDENTS
(LUSAKA 1714) TO PRESS FOR SMITH REPLY TO ZAMBIAN SEVEN-POINT
MESSAGE TRANSMITTED THROUGH SOUTH AFRICANS (PARA 10 LUSAKA
1662). MAIN PURPOSE OF THAT MEETING HAD BEEN TO CONSIDER
SMITH REPLY TO ZAMBIAN MESSAGE AND ZAMBIANS WILL WISH HAVE
SMITH RESPONSE IN HAND WHENEVER FOUR OR FIVE PRESIDENTS NEXT
GET TOGETHER.

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